Independent Researcher Dr. Erman Tatlıoğlu wrote about the transformation of the Russia-Ukraine War in the context of NATO summits and Türkiye's position for AA Analysis.
The Russia-Ukraine War has gone far beyond just being a military conflict between two states that has been going on since 2022. The crisis turned into a long-term geopolitical rupture that reshaped the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, transformed NATO's threat perception, and accelerated Ukraine's contacts with Western institutions. When the period from the extraordinary Brussels and Madrid summits in 2022 to the Ankara Summit in 2026 is examined, it is seen that NATO's approach to the crisis has changed significantly. While emergency support, crisis management and the concern to prevent the spread of conflict to NATO territory came to the fore in the first stage, in the following years, defense industry production, long-term military support, institutional integration and permanent deterrence became at the center of NATO policy. This transformation is seen from the Western security perspective as a necessary strategic response to Russia's military operation against Ukraine. In the Eurasianist circles of thought in Russia, the same situations are evaluated through a very different narrative. Alexander Dugin is one of the best-known representatives of this approach.
Dugin's thoughts should not be treated as a policy document that fully coincides with the official doctrine of the Russian state. However, the geopolitical framework he established on NATO expansion, Ukraine, Atlanticism and multipolarity is important for understanding the broader strategic and ideological narrative towards the West in Russia. Therefore, evaluating the transformation of NATO summits in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War from Dugin's perspective does not mean examining only the views of a thinker. At the same time, it helps to understand the historical basis on which the narratives of "Western threat", "civilizational state", "multipolarity" and "geopolitical siege" developing around Moscow are based.
At the heart of Dugin's thought is the idea that the world is not just a system of nation states. According to him, international politics is shaped by the struggle between larger areas of civilization and major geopolitical power centers. In this approach, the West is defined as an Atlanticist world. US leadership, NATO, the liberal international order and Western political institutions are the main tools of this Atlanticist system. Opposite this is Eurasia, centered on Russia. For Dugin, Russia is not an ordinary nation state. Russia is a "civilizational state" with its own value system, political order and historical line of development. For this reason, the West's presentation of concepts such as liberalism, democracy and human rights as universal norms is unacceptable in terms of Dugin's approach. These concepts are considered as tools for the West to carry its ideological order to other societies.
The expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU) is also considered in this context. According to Dugin, NATO's eastward advance is not just the expansion of a military alliance. Likewise, the EU's enlargement policy is not limited to economic or political integration. Both processes are different dimensions of the penetration of the Atlanticist world into the post-Soviet geography. Dugin's "Great War of the Continents" approach reveals the historical dimension of this idea. This struggle is not just about wars between armies. It is a historical competition between civilizations, values, economic models, political systems and geopolitical blocs. From this perspective, the Napoleonic Wars represent the first great wave, the Second World War and the Cold War represent the second wave, and the new world order that emerged after the Cold War and the Russia-Ukraine War represent the third wave. In Dugin's words, the West is trying to further its influence by including post-Soviet lands into the EU and NATO. Therefore, the Russia-Ukraine War is not a sudden crisis that emerged in 2022 within the scope of Dugin's narrative, but the new phase of the long-standing continental struggle.
The distance between ideological narrative and geopolitical reality
Dugin's approach is revealing in terms of understanding Russia's threat perception towards the West. However, this narrative is not enough to explain the entire geopolitical transformation in post-Soviet Europe. Especially in the expansion processes of NATO and the EU, the historical experiences and security perceptions of Eastern European countries often remain in the background in terms of Dugin's approach. For the Baltic states, Poland and many Central and Eastern European countries, Russia is not just a theoretical threat created by the West. The historical experiences of these countries with Russia and the Soviet Union have directly influenced their foreign policy choices. There is a similar perception of security in the approach of countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to Western institutions. Russia's military intervention in Ukraine has strengthened this trend rather than weakening it. The main problem at this point is that the parties explain the same geopolitical process through completely different causal relations. For Russia, NATO's eastward expansion created a security threat and forced Moscow to react. According to the Western perspective, Russia's policies towards neighboring countries have been one of the main reasons why these countries approached NATO and the EU.
Therefore, the issue arising in European security is a classic security dilemma. As Russia sees NATO expansion as a threat, it increases its military and political measures. These policies of Russia increase the security concerns of neighboring countries and strengthen their orientation towards NATO. Thus, a step taken by one of the parties to increase its own security is perceived as a new threat by the other party. As a result, as NATO expands, Russia feels more surrounded, and as Russia pursues harsher policies, the countries on NATO's eastern flank feel more in need of the alliance. This cycle is one of the most important structural problems of European security today.
Ukraine has a special place in Dugin's geopolitical thought. One of the basic approaches put forward within the framework of "Foundations of Geopolitics" is the idea that Russia-centered continental politics cannot be fully established without resolving the Ukraine issue. For Dugin, Ukraine is not an ordinary buffer state between Russia and the West. Ukraine is the main geopolitical borderline where the heart of Eurasia and the Atlanticist world meet.
There are several reasons for this importance. First of all, Ukraine is one of the most important geographies on Russia's Western border. Secondly, its access to the Black Sea is of critical importance in terms of warm seas and military strategy. Thirdly, Ukraine has an important place in the Russian historical and cultural identity narrative. Finally, Ukraine's foreign policy orientation directly affects Russia's Eurasia-centered great power assertion. Therefore, in Dugin's reading of geopolitics, Ukraine's approach to NATO or the EU is not seen solely as a foreign policy choice of an independent state. The process in question is interpreted as the fragmentation of the Russian historical space, the weakening of Slavic-Orthodox ties and the decline of the western border of the Eurasian center.
Dugin's classical land power-sea power distinction also comes into play here. Russia represents the continental land power, while the USA and NATO represent the Atlantic-based naval power. Ukraine is the area of contact and struggle between these two systems. Therefore, the rivalry over Ukraine has a much broader meaning than Kiev's foreign policy orientation. While Ukraine's integration into the Western system means the retreat of Eurasia in terms of the Dugin narrative, Russia's continued influence on Ukraine is considered as a limitation of Atlanticist expansion.
Brussels and Madrid: Defining Russia as a threat
The extraordinary Brussels and Madrid summits held in 2022 created NATO's first comprehensive strategic framework against conflict. NATO strongly condemned Russia's operation against Ukraine, demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, and clearly highlighted Belarus' role in the conflict. However, the alliance provided political and military support to Ukraine while avoiding becoming a party to the direct conflict. This approach formed the basic limit of NATO policy: Ukraine would be supported, but a direct military conflict would not be created between NATO and Russia.
One of the most important changes at the Madrid Summit was the definition of Russia as "the most important and direct threat". This definition is much more than symbolic. In the post-Cold War period, periodic cooperation mechanisms were established between Russia and NATO, and Moscow was accepted as an interlocutor in at least certain areas of the European security system. After Madrid, Russia increasingly began to be considered as a systemic threat positioned outside the Euro-Atlantic security order. The support provided to Ukraine also began to transform during this period. In addition to immediate military aid, the concepts of long-term durability, modernization and compliance with NATO standards came to the fore.
According to Dugin's geopolitical approach, the 2022 summits can be interpreted as "the Atlantic bloc's move to surround Russia." According to this approach, the crisis is not just a matter of defending Ukraine's sovereignty, as NATO states. The real struggle is between the US-centered unipolar order that emerged after the Cold War and Russia's attempt to regain great power status. This is why defining Russia as a direct threat is important. From Dugin's theoretical framework, this decision means that Russia is no longer part of the European security system and is placed in the position of a challenger outside the system.
Vilnius and the Atlanticization of Ukraine
The 2023 Vilnius Summit was an important turning point for the institutionalization of NATO-Ukraine relations. NATO confirmed that Ukraine's future lies in the alliance. Despite this, no direct membership invitation was given and the approach of meeting the necessary conditions with the agreement of the allies was maintained. However, the removal of the Membership Action Plan requirement for Ukraine and the creation of the NATO-Ukraine Council took relations between Kiev and the alliance to a new level.
In terms of Dugin's approach, the Vilnius Summit can be considered as the "Atlanticization of Ukraine". The first dimension of this transformation is the struggle for identity. From NATO's perspective, Ukraine is a sovereign European state with the right to determine its own foreign policy and security preferences. From Dugin's Eurasianist perspective, Ukraine's integration with Western institutions means the fragmentation of the Russian historical space and the weakening of the Slavic-Orthodox geopolitical bond. The second dimension is the geopolitical border line. In Dugin's land power-sea power distinction, Russia represents continental Eurasia, while the USA and NATO represent the Atlanticist naval power. Ukraine is the border region between the two systems. The third dimension is the NATO-Ukraine Council. For NATO, the Council is a mechanism for political dialogue, reform and coordination. In terms of Dugin's approach, it is a tool that enables the integration of the Ukrainian state structure with Atlantic institutions. Therefore, the main claim that emerges from Dugin's analysis is this: The West is actually moving Ukraine into the NATO security area without making it an official NATO member.
Washington: Irreversible integration
The Washington Summit in 2024 represented the stage in which the political commitment towards Ukraine became stronger. NATO declared that Ukraine was "irreversibly" on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration. This statement was a much stronger political message than in Vilnius. However, a direct membership invitation was not given again and the condition of agreement of the allies was maintained.
From Dugin's framework of geopolitical thought, the Washington Summit is the point where the war ceases to be just a territorial issue. One of Russia's main goals is to keep Ukraine out of NATO. In addition, it is aimed to stop the Western security architecture's advance towards the east and to protect Russia's sphere of influence in the multipolar world order. The approach emerging in Washington points to the exact opposite of these goals. Increasing the Ukrainian army's compliance with NATO standards, integrating training systems and establishing long-term defense ties are making Kiev's relationship with the Western security system increasingly structural.
Here one of the important strategic paradoxes of the war emerges. One of Russia's main concerns was the increasing influence of NATO over Ukraine. However, the prolongation of the conflict caused Ukraine to move closer to the NATO system. Therefore, no matter how the borders in the conflict area change, the transformation in Ukraine's security identity poses an important strategic problem for Russia.
At the 2025 Hague Summit, defense expenditures and defense industry production capacity were placed at the center of NATO's agenda. The Allies' approach to increase defense spending to 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) demonstrates the long-term transformation in NATO's threat assessment. Russia is no longer considered a short-term source of crisis, but a permanent strategic threat to European security. It is also an important change that direct contributions to Ukraine and support to the Ukrainian defense industry can be evaluated within the defense expenditures of the allies. This approach removes support for Ukraine from the classical "aid package" concept and associates it with NATO's collective defense planning. Increasing defense industry production, developing new military capabilities and strengthening the logistics infrastructure on the eastern flank are also parts of the same strategic transformation.
According to Dugin, Hague decisions are not economic or technical. These decisions express the geopolitical transformation of Europe. One of the main claims that Dugin has long defended is that the United States uses the Russian threat to keep Europe within the Atlantic system. For this reason, increasing the defense budgets of European countries, expanding the defense industry and strengthening the military capacity on NATO's eastern flank are seen as the institutionalization of the strategy of containing Russia. However, at this point, a significant contradiction emerged between Dugin's expectation and geopolitical reality. Dugin expects Europe to move away from the United States over time and form an independent continental power center. The opposite happened after the Ukraine crisis. Europe has become more integrated within the framework of NATO, at least in the field of security. In other words, this crisis seems to have contributed to the revival of NATO in the short and medium term rather than the dissolution of the Atlantic system predicted by Dugin.
However, the fact that NATO seems to have been revived after the Ukraine crisis does not mean that the dominance of the Atlantic system over Europe has been consolidated unquestionably and permanently. In the same period, the EU is moving towards strengthening its own defense capacity, developing common supply and production mechanisms, and establishing a more autonomous security infrastructure with programs such as SAFE. For this reason, it is not yet clear to what extent Europe will remain within the borders of the US-centered security architecture in the long term and to what extent it will develop its own strategic autonomy. In other words, although the Ukraine crisis contributed to the revival of NATO in the short and medium term, it is still an important question mark whether this revival will permanently bind Europe to the Atlanticist line. The dissolution of the Atlantic system that Dugin predicted did not occur, but Europe's quest to transform into an independent continental security actor has not completely disappeared.
Ankara Summit and long-term bloc competition
The 2026 Ankara Summit is one of the most significant stages of the transformation in NATO's perspective on the Russia-Ukraine crisis. The conflicts are no longer considered a temporary security crisis for the alliance. Multi-year support mechanisms for Ukraine, increasing defense industry production and strengthening the eastern flank show that NATO is acting according to the possibility of long-term competition. Advancing the training, analysis, compatibility and reform processes within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Council also leads to a closer connection of Ukraine to the NATO systematic. This process can be described as "the transition from the assistance phase to the integration bridge phase". Planning military equipment, training and long-term support for Ukraine also shows that NATO is acting with the assumption that the war may not end soon.
When viewed from Dugin's theoretical framework, the Ankara Summit can be considered as the "institutionalization of the military architecture of the New Cold War". Establishing multi-year support mechanisms for Ukraine, increasing NATO's defense production and strengthening its capacity on the eastern flank are interpreted as creating a permanent, not temporary, strategy against Russia. At this point, Dugin's multipolar world theory gains importance again. On the one hand, there is the Atlanticist model created by the US leadership, NATO, the liberal international order and Western institutions. On the other side, there are Russia-centered power fields, civilization-based poles, non-Western power centers, and the Eurasianist model based on the idea of multipolarity. According to Dugin's geopolitical approach, the Ankara Summit is a stage in which the military and institutional framework of the long-term struggle between these two models becomes more visible.
It is not enough to explain the ideological discourse used by Russia today solely in terms of Eurasianism or ideological patterns inherited from the Soviet period. Russia's ideological structure is a flexible and functional repertoire that can change according to the target audience, rather than a fixed doctrine. At the center of this repertoire is the understanding of great power and statism. In addition, the idea of the civilizational state, the narrative of the Western threat, the discourse of traditional values, the anti-fascist historical memory developed over the Second World War and the anti-colonial discourse towards the Global South are used in different contexts. In the discourse addressed to the Russian public, the survival of the state, historical siege and great power identity can come to the fore. Crises of the liberal system, the erosion of traditional values, or criticism of Western political elites can be used in the narrative about Western societies. In the discourse on the Global South, criticism of Western imperialism, colonialism and the unipolar world order is more prominent.
Therefore, for NATO, the problem is not only military. Information and propaganda war has become one of the main areas of geopolitical competition today. In the face of Russia's ability to send different messages to different societies, it will not be enough for NATO to run a uniform anti-propaganda campaign. The alliance must create a strategic communication model that takes into account the security concerns and political sensitivities of different societies and can develop different but internally consistent messages. At this point, the concepts of "narrative security" and "ideological resilience" may become more important in NATO's future strategic discussions.
Türkiye's position towards the Russia-Ukraine War is too complex to be explained by a simple policy of neutrality or mediation.
Türkiye NATO üyesidir, AB'ye aday bir ülkedir ve Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi'nin uygulayıcısıdır. It has significant military capacity in the Black Sea. In addition, it has political, economic and security relations with Russia and Ukraine. The Blue Homeland approach, the situations in the Caucasus and Türkiye's policy towards Black Sea security make Ankara's geopolitical position even more unique. The 2022 Brussels and Madrid summits are the first great balance test of the war for Turkey.
While NATO defined Russia as a direct threat, Türkiye supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, continued its policy of not recognizing Crimea's annexation to Russian territory, but did not completely close diplomatic channels with Russia. Türkiye's restriction of the passage of warships through the straits by implementing the Montreux Straits Convention has been one of the most important strategic steps that prevented the conflict in the Black Sea from turning into a wider military crisis.
The Black Sea has become one of the frontlines of European security following Russia's intervention in Ukraine. Despite this, the fact that initiatives such as the Grain Corridor Agreement can be carried out through Türkiye has demonstrated Ankara's capacity to communicate with both Moscow and Kiev. The fact that Sweden and Finland brought Türkiye's anti-terrorism sensitivities to the agenda during the NATO membership process at the Madrid Summit also demonstrated Ankara's bargaining power within the alliance.
The Vilnius Summit created two-way results for Türkiye. On the one hand, the NATO-Ukraine Council was established and Ukraine's approach to the NATO system accelerated. On the other hand, Türkiye brought national security issues such as the fight against terrorism, defense industry restrictions and relations with the EU to the NATO agenda during Sweden's membership process. For this reason, Vilnius is one of the important examples of the "recognition of national security concerns in exchange for alliance solidarity" approach for Türkiye.
The Washington Summit represents the stage in which Ukraine's approach to NATO becomes increasingly permanent. NATO's definition of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration path as "irreversible" has created an important strategic reality for Türkiye. Ankara now has to evaluate Ukraine's place within the Western security architecture not as a temporary crisis situation, but as an increasingly structural process. The main issue for Türkiye is to maintain a controlled relationship with Russia at the same time as continuing the support given to Ukraine.
The fact that the defense industry and defense expenditures come to the fore at the Hague and Ankara summits creates important opportunities for Türkiye. Turkey has the capacity to meet NATO's increasing needs in the fields of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), electronic warfare, naval platforms, ammunition, land systems, air defense and logistics. For this reason, NATO's approach to increasing defense expenditures should not be considered only as a financial burden for Türkiye. Defense industry exports and joint production diplomacy are turning into important tools that can increase Ankara's strategic weight within NATO.
The Ankara Summit is of special importance for Türkiye in this respect. Holding the summit in Ankara carries Türkiye's central role within NATO beyond the symbolic level. The fact that defense industry production, joint procurement and high defense investments have become central to the alliance agenda has made some of the theses that Türkiye has defended for a long time more visible. Ankara's approach to remove defense industry restrictions and ensure that exclusionary EU-based security mechanisms do not weaken NATO unity is gaining a stronger ground due to Europe's new security needs.
Türkiye should not be the outpost of a civilization camp
Dugin's geopolitical approach explains the world through the struggle between Atlanticist and Eurasian power centers. Türkiye's geopolitical position cannot be easily placed within this binary distinction. Türkiye is a member of NATO but has extensive relations with Russia. It is a candidate country for the EU, but it criticizes the exclusionary mechanisms in Europe's security policies. It supports Ukraine's territorial integrity but maintains diplomatic channels with Moscow. It is one of NATO's most important military actors in the Black Sea, but it also advocates limiting tensions in the region. This situation should not be considered as strategic indecision. On the contrary, it is a natural result of Türkiye's geography and its geopolitical capacity.
Türkiye's strategic power does not stem from being the outpost of any civilization camp. Türkiye's real strength is that it can be an indispensable country of connection and balance between competing centers of power. Therefore, Türkiye's best strategic line should be a policy that keeps diplomatic channels open with Russia, limits tension in the Black Sea, and transforms the defense industry and regional security capacity within NATO into strategic bargaining power.
However, it is not enough for Ankara to define itself only as a "non-party mediator". Türkiye must strengthen its position as an actor that has an autonomous weight within NATO, can establish balance in the Black Sea, and has become one of the indispensable capacity providers of the Alliance with its defense industry.
Result: Ideologies change, geopolitics remains
The process extending from 2022 to 2026 until the Ankara Summit shows that NATO's policy against the Russia-Ukraine War is developing on three basic axes.
First, Russia's attack on Ukraine was defined as a violation of international law and a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic security. Secondly, the support given to Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to self-defense has expanded over time to the dimensions of ammunition, air defense, education, intelligence, defense industry and institutional integration. Thirdly, NATO has avoided becoming a direct party to the war, but has permanently restructured its deterrence and defense order against Russia.
In Dugin's geopolitical reading, these situations are the gradual institutionalization of the Atlanticist world's strategy to contain Russia. For NATO, the same process is the strategic response to the security threat posed by Russia's military operation against Ukraine. The increasingly deepening problem here is that the parties produce their own security narratives in a way that increases each other's perception of threat. Russia presents NATO expansion as one of the main justifications for its military policies. NATO, on the other hand, shows Russia's policies as the main reason for strengthening its eastern flank and increasing its defense capacity. Thus, European security is entering into an increasingly harsh security dilemma.
One of the most striking aspects of Dugin's geopolitical approach is his claim that political systems and ideologies are temporary, while geography is permanent. Political systems can change. Leaders come and go. Ideologies appear and disappear. However, the basic strategic realities that arise from the fact that states are settled in geographical space continue to exist. Russia's interest in Ukraine, the Black Sea and its Western borders, the security of NATO's eastern flank and Türkiye's strategic position on the straits and the Black Sea cannot be explained only by current political situations. What changes after 2022 is not geography. What has changed is the way states perceive this geography and their strategic responses to it.
The real importance of the Ankara Summit emerges here. The summit is not just a meeting where support to Ukraine or NATO's defense expenditures are discussed. In a broader sense, it is an important stage in the process in which the Euro-Atlantic security order is being reshaped according to the long-term competition with Russia. In this new era, Turkey is becoming an increasingly central actor not only with its geographical location, but also with the Montreux Straits Convention, its military capacity in the Black Sea, the Russia-Ukraine balance, its influence in the Caucasus and its developing defense industry.
[Dr. Erman Tatlıoğlu is an Independent Researcher.]
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